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NOTE
Is the SEC the Appropriate Federal Agency for
Policing Bribery of Foreign Nationals by
Multinational Public Corporations?
by Ilsa M. Klein*
I. INTRODUCTION
O VER THE PAST few years, especially since the Watergate episode,
media attention has focused on a facet of criminal activity which had
been previously relegated to a position of lesser importance. Corporate
bribery of foreign nationals has become the subject of increased scrutiny.
An evaluation of corporate bribery requires the identification of numer-
ous competing interests-the actor, the recipient, corporate role models,
federal regulatory agencies, foreign laws, extraterritoriality of jurisdiction,
and the fluid workings of the free market economy.
The focus of this note is on: a clarification of types of corporate brib-
ery; the activities undertaken by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion in response to corporate bribery; and the question of whether the
Securities and Exchange Commission is the appropriate federal agency to
deal with corporate bribery.
At the outset, it is necessary to define the operational terms.
Although in everyday parlance an act of bribery and the concept of a
multinational corporation each conotes a certain image, they must be de-
scribed to better understand the nebulous character of existing
legislation.
II. BRIBERY
A. Definitions
A standard definition of a "multinational company," and one which
has been used in U.N. studies dealing with the impact of multinationals,'
* Case Western Reserve University School of Law, J.D. candidate (1982).
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, U.N., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS
IN WORLD DEVELOPMENT, II Annexes 118, U.N. Doc. ST/ECA/190 (1973). See generally DE-
PARTMENT OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, U.N., THE IMPACT OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORA-
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is "any firm which performs its main operations, either manufacture or
the provision of service, in at least two countries."2 The "host country" is
generally defined as "any country which receives foreign direct invest-
ment, especially a country in which a particular subsidiary is operating.""
A definition of the "home country" is "any country whose residents make
foreign direct investment, especially the country of origin of the company
described.""
A working definition of "bribery," however, is not as easily derived.
At common law, a bribe required that the recipient hold government of-
fice and that the objective of the bribe be to influence government deci-
sions.5 Kugel and Cohen have interpreted the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 19776 as defining bribery as "the payment of anything of value to a
foreign official, political party or candidate for office in order to affect,
directly or indirectly, the relationship of the bribing individual and the
host government. It does not forbid commercial bribery."7
B. Categories & History of Bribes
Three general categories of bribes exist: the transaction bribe, the
variance bribe, and the outright purchase.8 The transaction bribe, which
is sometimes referred to as a "grease" or "facilitating" payment," is made
to a public official to encourage the expeditious completion of a pre-
scribed duty.11 Such a payment is not undertaken to obtain a competitive
advantage. Instead, the transaction bribe is used to ensure the fulfillment
of a responsibility, to which the payer is already entitled, within a shorter
period of time. 2
The variance bribe' s is paid "to secure the suspension or nonapplica-
tion of a norm to a case where the application would otherwise be appro-
TIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, U.N. Doc. E/5500/ Rev. 1 ST/
ESA/6 (1974).
2 M. BROOKE & H. REMMERS, THE STRATEGY OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 5 (1970).
3 Id.
4 Id.
1 Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BUSINESS ETHICS: U.S. LEGISLA-
TION OF INTERNATIONAL PAYOFFS booklet 1, at 8 (1978).
' Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
1 Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, supra note 5, at 10.
s W. REISMAN, FOLDED LIES-BRIBERY, CRUSADES AND REFORMS 69 (1979).
9 Id. at 69-75.
1o AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN PAYMENTS, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF
NEW YORK, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS BY CORPORATIONS: THE PROBLEM
AND APPROACHES TO A SOLUTION 3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOR-
EIGN PAYMENTS].
l" W. REISMAN, supra note 8, at 69-75.
12 Id.
'1 W. REISMAN, supra note 8, at 75-88.
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priate."1' There are two types of variance bribes. The first kind is a bribe
given to preclude the application of an already established standard of
conduct, such as paying a product inspector to refrain from inspecting the
product. The second type of variance bribe is given to alter illegally an
effective norm, rather than only to seek its nonapplication to a particular
set of circumstances. An example of this category of bribery may be
found when a corporation pays a foreign official to affect a change in
overall foreign legislative trends or host government elections.15
The third category of bribes is the outright purchase.'6 The objective
of the outright purchase is "to acquire an employee who remains in place
in an organization to which he appears to pay full loyalty while actually
favoring the briber's conflicting interests."17
Although both Watergate 8 and Abscam'9 have brought the concept
of bribery to the forefront of the national news, bribery in fact dates back
several hundred years. The practice of bribing a government official
threads its way through history. Just one example dates back to the
1600's when Mogul rulers were given precious items made of copper,
brass and stone along with paintings and carvings as an enticement to
grant the British East India Company duty-free treatment for its
exports.20
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became directly in-
volved in investigating corporate bribery activities in 1973. At that time,
the Office of the Special Prosecutor charged several corporations and
their executive management with the misappropriation of corporate funds
used for illegal domestic political contributions.21 The SEC's interest in
this activity centered on the materiality of such information and the ef-
fect of its nondisclosure on public investors.2 Additional investigation of
the corporations by the SEC uncovered actions taken in blatant abroga-
tion of the securities laws. Corporate financial records had been falsified
and slush funds had been earmarked for questionable or illegal foreign
11 W. REISMAN, supra note 8, at 75.
16 W. REISMAN, supra note 8, at 78-79.
16 W. REISMAN, supra note 8, at 88-92.
'= W. REISMAN, supra note 8, at 88-89.
Sierck & Watson, Post-Watergate Business Conduct: What Role for the SEC?, 31
Bus. LAW. 721 (1976).
1' N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1980, § 1, at 1.
20 Gwirtzman, Is Bribery Defensible?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1975, § 6 (Magazine), at 19.
2' SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL COR-
PORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING,
AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94th Cong., 2d Seas. 2 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SEC
REPORT]. See, e.g., N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS & R. EELLS, BRIBERY AND EXTORTION IN WORLD
BUSINESS (1977).
' Id.
1981
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payments.2 3 Subsequent to this initial exposure of securities violations,
the SEC expanded its investigation and sought injunctions against several
corporations.
24
III. REGULATION OF BRIBERY ACTIVITY
A. Is Regulation Necessary?
Prior to developing a regulatory scheme to control effectively ques-
tionable and illegal foreign payments, it must be determined whether
such control is necessary. This may be ascertained by evaluating the pur-
pose to be served by questionable and illegal foreign payments and the
potential ramifications of establishing such parameters for the legality of
these transactions.
Questionable and illegal foreign payments impact directly upon both
multinational politics and economics. Focusing on the relationship be-
tween the host government and the multinational corporation, David
Blake arrived at four potential objectives of multinational corporations
which would justify their attempts to exert influence: (1) generating
favorable government policies directly pertaining to the particular corpo-
ration, (2) improving societal attitudes to benefit the entire industry of
which the particular corporation is a member, (3) allying with other mul-
tinational corporations to affect government policies in a general way and
thereby facilitating operations for multinationals in host countries, and
(4) joining with local businesses to direct their efforts towards a better
socioeconomic environment as well as a stronger free enterprise system.2 5
Based on these objectives, one might assume that the involvement of the
multinational corporation in the host country's politics and society neces-
sarily has a positive effect. Using the bribe as a tool, however, the foreign
corporation has the means of determining its host government's foreign
relations by compelling indirect dealings with the corporation's home
country.
The multinational corporation, through the use of illegal foreign po-
litical contributions, may also support a political party or candidate
which it perceives might provide the most beneficial environment for cor-
porate activities. In addition, because a significant number of multina-
23 Id. at 3.
", In response to the SEC injunctions, each corporation consented to a permanent in-
junction which prohibited any further violation of the federal securities laws. None of the
corporate defendants either admitted or denied the charges. See SEC REPORT, supra note
20, at Exhibit B, reprinted in 1 MANAGING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE 317 (A. Cohen & S.
Friedman Co-chairmen 1978).
2 Blake, Government, Politics, and the Multinational Enterprise, in INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS-GOVERNMENT & AFFAIRS, TOWARD AN ERA OF ACCOMMODATION 68-69 (J. Fayer-
weather ed. 1973).
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tional corporations market products which are necessary for conventional
warfare and which are often determinative of a host country's foreign pol-
icies, the national security impact of the products has affected their host
country's political relations.2 6 Thus, it certainly becomes questionable
from the host country's perspective whether any such scenario is
beneficial.
The multinational corporation, however, generates its greatest politi-
cal influence through its economic impact. On an annual basis, it is esti-
mated that multinational corporations located in many European host
countries contribute to overall capital formation at a rate of two to ten
percent, and to the growth of industrial capital at a rate of five to fifteen
percent.27 It has also been estimated that between 1950 and 1975 more
than $120 billion had been invested by U.S. multinationals in their host
countries.2"
Multinational corporations are often found to be both larger in their
size of operation and more technically advanced than the national enter-
prises found in the host countries. " In addition, unlike a national enter-
prise, it is conceivable that a multinational corporation will function in an
oligopolistic market.30 In instances where multinationals have settled in
less developed countries, increased productivity for the region and politi-
cal and social upheaval from the established traditions have often re-
sulted. This form of advancement then exacerbates the disparity between
the technological and financial advances, as well as the social environ-
ment in which they operate.31 In a host country in which the societal
standards and the economy are in transition, as an outgrowth of signifi-
cant amounts of direct foreign investment, a questionable or illegal pay-
ment will represent sufficient strength to affect a favorable response to
the multinational corporation. Consequently, a multinational corporation
could wield extensive, and potentially unchecked, abusive power.
B. Problems
The regulation of questionable and illegal foreign payments by mul-
tinational corporations is rendered a difficult, as well as a frustrating,
2 Vernon, Multinational Enterprise and National Security, in THE ECONOMIC AND PO-
LITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: AN ANTHOLOGY 95 (1972).
27 1 BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE MULTINA-
TIONAL CORPORATION-STUDIES ON U.S. FOREIGN INVESTMENT 81 (1972).
28 N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS & R. EELLS, supra note 20, at xix.
'9 COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES, ORGANIZATION FOR ECO-
NOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES 57 (1977).
SO Id.
11 1 BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE, supra note 24, at 82.
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task. The first problem is one of definition. When is the commonplace
gratuity transformed into an illegal payment?
The second problem focuses on a determination of a working stan-
dard. In every multinational transaction there are two sets of laws to be
applied and followed-those of the home country and those of the host
country. In many countries, the transaction bribe is not illegal, rather, it
is thought to be quite necessary for a smoothly functioning economy.,"
Conversely, in the United States such a payment was regarded as a form
of bribery prior to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.33 Subse-
quently, the use of the transaction bribe has been strictly monitored .' To
serve as a successful deterrent for such activity, the regulations of foreign
bribery must reconcile the often divergent standards of the home and
host countries so that the multinational corporation does not find itself at
a competitive disadvantage internationally.
The third problem is jurisdictional in nature. The United States can
certainly regulate the domestic activities and methodology used by corpo-
rations.35 However, in an era of increased foreign trade and global inter-
dependence, other countries may regard the United States as presumptu-
ous and self-righteous in its attempts to influence all international
transactions to which U.S. nationals are but one of the parties involved.
A fourth problem to be resolved is the extent to which the executive
tier of corporate management should be held accountable for the illegal
foreign payments made by its employees both with and without its
knowledge. Arguably, applying agency principles, management should
continue to have ultimate responsibility for all corporate activities even
though it may not be literally aware of each detail. Certainly this would
be an ideal approach. However, because of the dramatic growth of the
multinational public corporation, the assumption of total liability by
management may be unjust. Such an approach, in a few isolated in-
stances, would also discourage some highly competent individuals from
accepting management roles and responsibilities.
Although there are innumerable issues to be dealt with when trying
to regulate such a complex activity, the four cited should serve to indicate
the broad expanse of problems to be resolved for the successful adminis-
tration of such a regulatory policy.
32 See generally, McCloy on Corporate Payofls, 54 HARV. Bus. REv. 14 (July-Aug.
1976).
s Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
3' To further curtail improper foreign payments, the Justice Department has also made
Oise of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 which preclude the use of any communications medium for
fraudulent purposes, and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1143 which stipulate that money and other ne-
gotiable instruments be reported upon transport outside of the United States.
31 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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C. Legislation
The initial attempt to regulate the purchase of securities on a na-
tional basis, rather than on a strictly state basis, may be considered a by-
product of the Crash of 1929.6 Between 1923 and 1933 investors lost ap-
proximately $25 billion by the sale of worthless securities to the public
through false or incomplete representations.3 7 This crisis prompted con-
gressional action. In response to a recommendation by President Franklin
Roosevelt,3" the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency supported
bill S.875s 8 by enunciating the motivating policy as "informing the inves-
tor of the facts concerning securities to be offered for sale in interstate
and foreign commerce and providing protection against fraud and misrep-
resentation.""' Initially, it was felt that the Federal Trade Commission
would be responsible for overseeing the administration and enforcement
of this national legislation. Within a year after S.875 was considered in
committee, however, the same Senate committee considered S.3420,"' the
purpose of which was "to provide for the regulation of securities ex-
changes and of over-the-counter markets operating in interstate and for-
eign commerce and through the mails. '4 2 Once again, the events sur-
rounding the Crash of 1929 were a motivating force. As President
Roosevelt stated, "The people of this country are, in overwhelming major-
ity, aware of the fact that unregulated speculation in securities and in
commodities was one of the most important contributing factors in the
artificial and unwarranted 'boom' which had so much to do with the terri-
ble conditions of the years following 1929."4 3
President Roosevelt perceived the necessary objectives of any sub-
stantive legislation in this regulatory area as being: first, the establish-
ment of such high margin requirements that the necessary result would
be greatly reduced market speculation, and second, the allocation of ex-
plicit authority to the national government to supervise the exchanges
36 This conclusion may be inferred from the severity and timing of investor losses. Id.
at 2. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
37 Id.
38 In his message, President Roosevelt described the proposed legislation as adding "to
the ancient rule of caveat emptor, the further doctrine of 'Let the seller also beware.' It puts
the burden of telling the whole truth on the seller." Message from Franklin D. Roosevelt to
the Congress (March 29, 1933), 77 CONG. REc. 954, reprinted in 1 Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN,
supra note 5, at 6-7.
389 See S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
'0 Id. at 1.
" See S. REP. No. 792, 73 Cong, 2d Sess. (1934).
Id. at 1.
, Letter from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Duncan U. Fletcher (March 26, 1934), re-
printed in 1 Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, supra note 5, at 9.
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and to correct any ensuing abuses. The Senate committee embraced the
President's desire to curtail strictly the abusive practice of using credit
for speculation. In addition, the Senate emphasized the need to eliminate
"the secrecy surrounding the financial condition of corporations which in-
vite the public to purchase their securities."4 5 Also, the Senate vested a
special commission administered by presidential appointees "with power
to eliminate undue hardship and to prevent and punish evasion."' 4"
Based upon these concerns for well-informed public investors, the
Securities Act of 193347 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were
promulgated. 48 The Securities Act of 1933 requires registration with the
government of all nonexempt securities, and an accompanying registra-
tion statement which should disclose all information pertinent to the
company and the stock.49 The registration statement must be accompa-
nied by a prospectus which is to be furnished to all prospective purchas-
ers of the security.5 0 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 broadens the
application of the Securities Act of 1933 by requiring that information
previously disclosed in compliance with the 1933 Act be updated, 51 and
by augmenting the statutory applicability to include stock transactions
subsequent to the initial issue. 52 The SEC was created by mandate of the
1934 Act for the purpose of administering federal securities regulations
and overseeing all securities exchanges registered with it.58 In addition,
the Act requires: registration statements of the securities be properly
filed, brokers and dealers practices controlled and the manner of sales of
a security be regulated (e.g. short-selling).5 The Act also grants the SEC
broad, flexible rule-making powers. 55
Within the parameters of illegal foreign payments, congressional in-
tent to regulate has been manifested through the interpretation and ap-
plication of Sections 10, 12 and 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934." Section 10b deals with the employment of manipulative and de-
ceptive devices. It is illegal under that section to make use of, either di-
rectly or indirectly, interstate commerce, the mail, or the facilities of any
44 1 Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, supra note 5, at 9.
41 1 Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, supra note 5, at 12.
46 1 Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, supra note 5, at 12.
41 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1976).
11 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976).
" See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77e, 77g (1976).
"O 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1976).
61 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1976).
62 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78o (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s, 78m, 78x, 78d-1 (1976).
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 781, 78m (1976).
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national securities exchange to defraud, to make a false statement or an
omission as to a material fact, or to act in a fraudulent manner. 57 Under
Section 12, which deals with registration requirements for securities,
every security registered with the SEC must include all information "nec-
essary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure
fair dealing in the security."5 8 Section 13, which pertains to the filing of
periodical reports, also emphasizes protection and fairness when dealing
with investors. This section requires that updates be submitted to the
SEC to "keep reasonably current the information and documents
required."5 9
Implicitly, the language of those sections of the Securities Act of
1934 indicates that the SEC can employ the tool of disclosure to uncover
illegal foreign payments. With disclosure as the frame of reference, the
corollary issue becomes materiality, or, what information is sufficiently
important to investors that registrants with the SEC be required to in-
clude it when they file.
There is no definition of materiality provided within the body of ei-
ther the 1933 or the 1934 Act. Under the general rules and regulations of
the Securities Act of 1933, however, rule 405(1) defines material as cover-
ing all "those matters as to which an average prudent investor ought rea-
sonably to be informed before purchasing the security registered."' In
trying to apply the definition of materiality, it becomes apparent that
materiality is a broad, nebulous concept. As determined in the SEC Re-
port, "[T]here is no litmus paper test. Each case normally presents
unique combinations of facts, and the consideration whether particular
information should be disclosed necessarily depends on the context in
which the question arises. ' 's
The courts, aware that a single standard does not prevail, have had
to determine appropriate tests of materiality in nondisclosure cases. Until
1976, circuit courts vacillated as to the degree of probability necessary to
determine that disclosure of a fact would impact on an investor's deci-
sion." In 1976, the Supreme Court narrowed the criteria for determining
materiality by assessing "the inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would
draw from a given set of facts and the significance of those inferences to
him."6 The type of information which is generally felt to be material, and
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
88 15 U.S.C. § 781(b)(2) (1976).
69 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a)(1) (1976).
0 17 C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1981).
1' SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 22.
42 Compare Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642 (7th Cir. 1963); List v. Fashion
Park, 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir., 1965); Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384
(1970); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1972).
63 TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976).
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
therefore should be disclosed to investors, falls into seven broad catego-
ries: financial and economic data; quality and style of management; any
information requested by a significant number of shareholders; material
indicative of corporate standards of ethics; risk involvement and the im-
pact of disclosure on business; correct and fully documented company
books; and disclosure necessitated by the public interest."'
D. The SEC
The SEC's interest in questionable and illegal foreign payments was
predicated on the Commission's belief that such activity, often resulting
in falsification of corporate financial records and the creation of secret
"slush funds," was indeed material to investors' evaluations and therefore
should be disclosed. As the Commission concluded, "These practices cast
doubt on the integrity and reliability of the corporate books and records
which are the very foundation of the disclosure system established by the
federal securities laws."" Clearly, the SEC has undertaken to become the
watchdog over such illegal activity by invoking its disclosure provisions.
Directed toward its enforcement efforts, the SEC relied on two types
of disclosure programs: active investigations on the Commission's part,
and a voluntary disclosure program. In 1975, following the SEC's inquiry
into illegal domestic campaign contributions, the Commission brought in-
junctions against nine corporations.6 Within the following year, the nine
corporations, along with five additional corporate defendants, all con-
sented to permanent injunction judgments which preclude subsequent
federal securities laws violations." In addition, 13 of the corporations
were required to form special review committees panelled by outside
members of their boards of directors to investigate the charges." The
committees were then required to report in detail to their corporate
boards of directors. Following this review procedure, each corporation's
management was then to submit a form 8-K to the SEC bringing to the
Commission's attention interim revisions in the corporate position."
Realizing that its resources were limited, the SEC instituted a volun-
tary program of disclosure of illegal foreign payments to encourage
greater corporate self-policing and responsiveness.7 The SEC sought to
have corporations conduct internal investigations by individuals not in-
volved with foreign bribery activity. If the investigation revealed any ille-
64 1 Y. KUGEL & N. COHEN, supra note 5, at 22-26.
61 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.
11 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 3.
11 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 4.
61 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 4.
19 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 4-5.
70 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 6-7.
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gality, the corporation was then "encouraged" to meet with Commission
staff members to arrive at an appropriate method of disclosure prior to
filing a form 8-K as an information update.7 1 The SEC has contended
that playing an advisory role is well within its ambit under rules 1(d) and
2 of its guide of Informal and Other Procedures.7 2
In its advisory capacity, the SEC has taken several factors into con-
sideration prior to determining in what manner an illegal foreign pay-
ment should be disclosed. These considerations include: the accounting
treatment already given to the questionable payment; the amount of the
questionable payment and its legality under host country law; the reason
for the payment and the recipient's position as a government employee or
a private businessman; whether the payment was an isolated occurrence
or if it was part of a habitual practice; corporate knowledge and support
of the practice; and what actions the company had undertaken to curb
such illegal activities. 8 In general, the SEC has held that questionable or
illegal foreign payments are material and should be disclosed if the
amount paid is substantial or if the amount paid is insignificant, disclo-
sure is required if the payment relates to a substantial amount of
business.74
The Commission also gave significant weight to the relation between
home and host country laws, and to whether the payment's recipient had
been employed in the public or private sector and in what position."5 If a
foreign payment was illegal under home country laws it must be dis-
closed; and, if a payment was illegal under host country laws it must usu-
ally be disclosed. Disclosure was not usually required if the payment was
not illegal under both home and host country laws.7" In such an instance,
the payment was perceived as a "routine expenditure made in the ordi-
nary course of business." '
The SEC Report segregated foreign payment recipients into govern-
ment officials, and commercial agents and consultants. 7 8 The Report indi-
cated that "in the ordinary course of business" a corporation would not
normally be making a payment to a foreign government official.7 9 There-
fore, all variance bribes were regarded as being subject to disclosure.80
Transaction bribes, or facilitating payments, which have been legal in
71 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 8-10.
7. 17 C.F.R. §§ 202.1(d), 202.2 (1981); see SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 7 n.5.
78 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 17.
74 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 15.
75 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 17.
76 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 24-25.
77 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 29.
78 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 25-28.
79 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
80 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
many countries, were material and therefore disclosable if: (1) a particu-
lar individual had been receiving substantial amounts; (2) the aggregate
amount was substantial, or (3) corporate management had falsified corpo-
rate books and records to conceal such payments.81 As a blanket ruling,
the Commission did not find payments to nonofficial nationals to be dis-
closable events.8 2 The Report, however, did present a number of factors
to be taken into account before arriving at a decision of nondisclosure.8 "
By the time the Commission had submitted its report to the Senate
in 1976, 95 companies had disclosed questionable or illegal foreign pay-
ments, either voluntarily or as a result of the SEC's efforts." An overview
of the corporate respondents indicates that the majority represented
manufacturing concerns; primarily drug manufacturers and corporations
which dealt in petroleum refining and ancillary industries.8 " The transac-
tions most often cited were payments to foreign officials. 6 The majority
of those corporations which voluntarily disclosed payments of foreign po-
litical contributions contended that such contributions were legal in the
host country. More companies reported questionable and illegal foreign
payments than questionable domestic payments.8 " It is possible that cor-
porations were more amenable to reporting foreign rather than domestic
payments because of the ambiguity of the law and subsequent exposure
to legal action. Although some foreign payments were made under condi-
tions that were knowingly illegal, many payments were legal in the host
country. Combining the misapplication of host country law with the lack
of clear definition in certain facets of U.S. law, conceivably corporate
management did not become aware of their illegalities until after the pay-
ments had been disclosed to federal authorities.
The Commission's Report optimistically concluded that the SEC did
not feel that American business should receive a blanket condemnation.8
As a result of the juncture between the enforcement and voluntary disclo-
sure policies, the Commission maintained that the ultimate effect will be
stronger corporate management and an augmentation of the public's con-
SI SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 27.
82 "There is nothing inherent in this practice that gives rise to a disclosure obligation
under the federal securities laws." SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 27.
"3 "Among the key factors to be considered in determining whether disclosure may be
required is the relationship of the agent to the governmental entity or contracting party, the
size and nature of the payment, the services to be performed by the agent, and the method
and manner of payment." SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 28.
8' SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 37.
81 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 37.
8 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 37.
87 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 37-39.
88 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 54.
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fidence in the business sector.s9 The Commission did, however, support
what it termed "limited-purpose legislation ... to demonstrate clear con-
gressional policy with respect to a thorny and controversial problem." 90
Although it acknowledged Congress' legislative function, the Commission
requested that any legislation directed at restricting questionable or ille-
gal foreign payments include three components: a prohibition against cor-
porations falsifying accounting records, a prohibition against misrepre-
sentations made by corporate management to auditors, and a
requirement that internal accounting controls be established and main-
tained by corporate management.9
E. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Based on the SEC Report, Congress concluded that there was "a se-
rious breach in the operation of the Commission's system of corporate
disclosure. ' '9 2 As a result, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1977." The Act is divided into two areas; Section 102 which deals
with accounting standards, and Sections 103 and 104 which pertain to the
foreign corrupt practices of issuers and domestic concerns. Section 102
requires that the registrants with the SEC maintain stringent internal ac-
counting controls carefully overseen by management.9 4 Ostensibly, this
provision was designed to eradicate the existence of slush funds which
were not indicated on the corporate books.9 5 Section 102, however, has a
potentially broader impact than would be apparent at first blush. This
provision of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act does not establish a floor
below which questionable transactions might otherwise be regarded as
immaterial to the company's overall financial position, and there is no
direct mention of foreign payments. Consequently, disclosure is required
of all payments, both domestic and foreign, by utilizing the appropriate
accounting controls.
Sections 103 and 104 make illegal the bribery of foreign officials by
domestic concerns, and allow for the imposition of criminal sanctions
against appropriate corporate management. 6 A few points in these provi-
sions are notable.9 7 First, culpability is not based on actually making a
89 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 55.
0 SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 57.
' SEC REPORT, supra note 20, at 57-59.
's S. REP. No. 95-114, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4098.
" Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified in various sections of 15 U.S.C.).
"4 Id. at § 102.
95 See S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 76, at 7, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEWS 4098, 4105.
9- 15 U.S.C. §§ 67dd-1, 78dd-2 (Supp. III 1979).
V See Atkeson, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An International Applica-
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foreign payment; promise of payment is sufficient." Second, although a
foreign subsidiary might in fact execute the payment, the parent com-
pany remains liable. 9 Third, acknowledging a longstanding practice
throughout many parts of the world, Congress determined that the trans-
action bribe, or facilitating payment, was not illegal.100 To achieve this
end, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act omits from its definition of "for-
eign official" any mention of a foreign employee with primarily ministe-
rial or clerical functions. 10 1 Finally, before the Justice Department may
prosecute the employee who actually engaged in the transaction, it must
first obtain the corporate defendant's conviction.0 2
As indicated by Estey and Marston despite the congressional intent
to focus prosecutorial efforts on corporations rather than on their agents,
practically, such a provision becomes an almost insurmountable impedi-
ment to establishing further corporate liability.'0 3 Without first seeking
and obtaining the conviction of the employee who handled the payment,
it is unlikely that sufficient evidence could be obtained to support a cor-
porate conviction. Therefore, in order to obtain the employee's testimony
it would probably be necessary to grant him immunity from prosecution.
Although the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has aided in forming a
definition of the legal bounds of corporate activity, a few other issues
have impacted significantly on the SEC's scope of operation. 0 " In polic-
ing foreign bribery activity, the SEC has been granted jurisdiction over
the regulation of all activities of public companies, not only those activi-
ties associated with the issuance or trading of securities.0 5 Also, the Com-
mission's authority over the internal accounting controls and activities of
registered corporations has been expanded.106 Initially, this broader au-
thority was demonstrated by the prohibition against the falsification of
books and misrepresentation to auditors, along with the power to require
review and guidance by audit committees. 10 7 The potential for extensive
private right of action litigation by shareholders or competitors as a result
tion of SEC's Corporate Governance Reforms, 12 INT'L LAW. 703 (1978); Estey & Marston,
Pitfalls (and Loopholes) in the Foreign Bribery Law, FORTUNE, Oct. 9, 1978, at 182.
" 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a) (Supp. III 1979).
99 Id.
100 See S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 76, at 10, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4098, 4108.
101 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
102 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(3), 78dd-2(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
1o Estey & Marston, supra note 78, at 188.
04 Ferrara & Goelzer, Saints and Sinners Concluded: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, in TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATE CONDUCT-THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES LAWS ON Eu-
ROPEAN AND UNITED STATES OPERATIONS 143, 161-62 (1979).
15 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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of injury sustained through false accounting records has also been
provided. 09
Taken in its entirety, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act has empow-
ered the SEC to assert its authority over the internal corporate structure
even prior to the point at which illegal corporate activity occurs. Should
such illegalities nevertheless take place, it is now possible for shareholders
and other interested parties to bring a cause of action for violation of the
established internal corporate controls.
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO SEC REGULATION
A. SEC: Problems & Criticism
The legislative reforms, along with the Commission's opinion, pre-
suppose that the SEC should be policing the foreign bribery activity of
multinationals. There is a question, however, as to whether the SEC
should have been granted jurisdiction over such corporate activity. If the
SEC were not responsible for the policing function, a multiplicity of
replacements would be available, if not vying, for the position.
The possible administrative alternatives to SEC regulation might be
more profitably explored after a discussion of the problems and criticism
which the SEC has encountered in its present fulfillment of its legislated
function. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act emphasizes criminalization;
penalties for violation include heavy fines of up to $1 million for issuers, a
maximum $10,000 fine for individual officers or directors of such an is-
suer, and jail sentences ranging up to five years. 0 9 Criminalization, how-
ever, creates enforcement problems. As Congress has delegated the re-
sponsibilities, the SEC handles the investigation and may bring suits for
injunction, while the Justice Department handles the criminal prosecu-
tions."0 Some critics contend that this division of labor actually subjects
the SEC to a disparate portion of the work.' Should Commission staff
elect to file criminal charges, the staff must then work with the Justice
Department to aid in the preparation of its case. Once the case reaches
the Justice Department the delegation of duties remains somewhat
unclear.
In addition, under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act the Justice De-
los Id.
109 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (Supp. III 1979). See Mathews, Enforcement of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act, in THE NEW REVIEW PROCEDURE UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC-
TICES ACT 433-34 (R. Beckler, A. Levenson & R. Shine Co-chairmen, 1980).
. 110 S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 76, at 11-12, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 4098, 4108-10.
" Lashbrooke, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Unilateral Solution to
an International Problem, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 227, 236 n.54 (1979); Estey & Marston,
supra note 78, at 719.
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partment has the authority to investigate and prosecute all domestic con-
cerns except for the relatively small number of SEC registrants.1 2 In the
latter instance, the SEC maintains jurisdiction." 3 It is generally felt that
this division is a further indication of the seemingly inequitable degree of
responsibility that has been meted out to the SEC."" The Senate, how-
ever, felt that to burden the Justice Department with additional investi-
gative responsibilities would have been duplicative of the SEC's efforts
and would have been more costly to the Government. 5 Furthermore, the
ambiguous distinction between the SEC's and the Justice Department's
stipulated roles has created an inconsistency of interpretation. Until re-
cently, no advice or working guidelines had been provided, by the Com-
rmission or the Justice Department, to explain the intricacies of the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act. The Justice Department established a review
procedure several months ago so that corporate management could con-
sult about the likelihood of litigation resulting from a questionable trans-
action, prior to the transaction's occurrence.'16 Although this seems quite
equitable from the perspective of the Justice Department, a major prob-
lem does exist. The SEC has not agreed to support the Justice Depart-
ment in its determination of the standards of legality of a particular
transaction under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." 7 Consequently, the
SEC cannot bring suit for an injunction against a corporation for engag-
ing in an activity which the Justice Department upheld as legal and
therefore not subject to further litigation."' Corporate management
would probably be skeptical of participating in this type of advance dis-
closure practice and thus subjecting itself to suspicion in the face of such
a substantial, and as yet unresolved, administrative inconsistency.
Any corrective effort to facilitate the implementation of this program
should be aimed at using the standards employed by the SEC and the
Justice Department. In addition, corporate management would probably
be more cooperative if it could be assured that any disclosure would be
kept confidential. Although the Justice Department has guaranteed se-
crecy, the concern still permeates management that trade secrets and
marketing information could be obtained by competitors through the
Freedom of Information Act" 9 or through more informal channels of in-
12 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(3), 78dd-2(b)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
113 S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 76, at 3, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 4098, 4101.
"4 Lashbrooke, supra note 83.
11 S. REP. No. 95-114, supra note 76, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
408, 4109.
"' A Feleral Clinic on Keeping It Legal, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 7, 1980, at 64.
117 Id.
1l8 Id.; Foreign Bribes, TIME, Nov. 26, 1979, at 61.
119 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
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formation release. 20 Perhaps by example and positive experiences, the
Government will be able to gain the corporate confidence necessary to
make this review procedure a viable enterprise. Management might be
encouraged to participate by implementing a reduced penalty scale for
activities found to be illegal after corporate management had, in good
faith, sought the guidance of the Justice Department, as compared to
those corporations which do not avail themselves of this service. These
efforts, when taken in combination, could provide a basis for a successful
remedy to the regulatory stumbling blocks.
The SEC has also been criticized as being "morally imperialistic" in
its legislative attempt.12 1 Most countries have laws making bribery ille-
gal. 1' The perceived heavy-handedness of the United States, however, is
thought to be potentially antagonistic to other nations by intimidating
them into prosecuting their own officials, when they might not otherwise
do so.' While this extraterritorial approach could conceivably affect
world ethics over an extended period of time, nevertheless, foreign coun-
tries could balk at the unwarranted and unsolicited pressure exerted by
U.S. law. The expansiveness of the Commission's approach was summa-
rized by former SEC Commissioner A. A. Sommer, Jr. He felt that the
SEC ignored the distinction between "disclosure as a means for informing
investors and disclosure as a means of altering conduct.''24 As an out-
growth of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, businessmen have com-
plained of feeling the derisiveness of foreign purchasers and have indi-
cated that U.S. corporations are at a competitive disadvantage in the
world market. 28
If corporations and foreign countries are unhappy with the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, the SEC will have difficulty maintaining its credi-
bility and effectiveness. The alternatives to the SEC's jurisdictional au-
thority, derived from the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, are numerous
and varied in approach ranging from the national to the international. At
present, in addition to the SEC and the Justice Department, several U.S.
agencies have competing and overlapping interests in overseeing the limi-
tation of questionable and illegal foreign payments.
120 Foreign Bribes, supra note 88.
'2' N. JACOBY, P. NEHEMKIS & R. EELLS, supra note 20, at 219.
Note, Prohibiting Foreign Bribes: Criminal Sanctions for Corporate Payments
Abroad, 10 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 231, 235 (1977).
122 Lashbrooke, supra note 83, at 241; The Big Payoff, TIME, Feb. 23, 1976, at 28.
124 Guzzardi, An Unscandalized View of Those "Bribes" Abroad, FORTUNE, July 1976,
at 118, 121.
M See, e.g., Misinterpreting the Antibribery Law, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 3, 1979, at 150;
Business Without Bribes, NEWSWEEK, FEB. 19, 1979, AT 63.
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B. The Internal Revenue Service
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has exhibited an interest in the
disclosure of bribes, but only as far as the payment of the appropriate
taxes is concerned.12 According to Section 162(c)(1) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code (Code), no deductions are allowable for payments made to gov-
ernment officials or agents in any country, so long as the payments violate
the laws of the United States. 127 If such a payment has been deducted,
the IRS requires payment of the tax on the impermissible deduction. The
IRS may also assess a negligence penalty equaling five percent of the un-
derpayment,12 or a penalty for fraud totaling fifty percent of the
underpayment. 12 9
Under the Tax Reform Act of 1976, the Code sanctions were broad-
ened.130 Income derived as a direct result of the payment of a foreign
bribe becomes taxable to the parent company in the United States. The
IRS also prepared an 11-item questionnaire directed to all major U.S.
corporations. The survey sought to ferret out details of tax accounting
practices which might have indicated Code violations.'
Two criticisms' 32 have been directed against the IRS approach. First,
the threat of IRS sanctions is not an effective deterrent to illegal activ-
ity.133 A company could conceivably pay a bribe and not take it as a de-
duction. Second, the effectiveness of the IRS approach is determined by
administrative discretion on an ad hoc basis. 134 This lack of uniformity,
caused by a shortage of resources, makes it impossible to subject each
corporation to a complete audit. To ensure thoroughness, however, the
audits that do occur would necessarily need to be more extensive than the
traditional audit. Consequently, the corporation would face the possibility
of a harsh penalty for fraud.3 5
The criticisms leveled against this approach accurately reflect the
simplistic attitude assumed by the IRS itself. The underlying assumption
of the Code is that the information supplied to the IRS represents an
accurate assessment of the company's financial position. However, this fo-
cus ignores the possibility of omissions from or falsifications of corporate
records and reflects no interest in international business practices or the
120 I.R.C. §§ 162(c)(1), 7201, 7203.
127 Id. § 162(c)(1).
' Id. § 6653(a).
129 Id. § 6653(b).
130 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified at I.R.C. § 952).
13l REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 23.
132 REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 23.
13 REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 23.
131 REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 23.
"I REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 23.
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motivating causes for such illegal payments. The IRS, therefore, has iso-
lated an area of interest and has disregarded the vast scope of the prob-
lem. The result is a piecemeal, and ineffective, solution.
C. The Federal Trade Commission
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) also maintains a degree of ju-
risdiction over the control of questionable and illegal foreign payments
through its ability to investigate foreign trade conditions. 3 One essential
purpose of the Commission's activities is to prevent corporations from us-
ing "unfair or deceptive acts or practices" which affect commerce.1 37 The
FTC's concern with foreign bribery is premised on the view that once a
corporation offers a bribe, that corporation assumes an unfair competitive
advantage in the international market.
The FTC bases is authority upon: the Sherman Act,1 88 the Clayton
Act, '3 and the Federal Trade Commission Act. 4 ' Under the Sherman
Act, bribery may be construed as a restraint on trade which impairs free
competition through unlawful market control.'" The Clayton Act prohib-
its the receipt of payments by the seller in a sales transaction unless ser-
vices have been rendered. 142 Several lower courts have applied this provi-
sion directly to' the areas of export sales and foreign bribery. 43 Unfair
methods of competition and disparate pricing structures are also prohib-
ited by the Federal Trade Commission Act. 44 An unfair method of com-
petition refers to the utilization of an illegal payment to generate sales
contracts. It is then likely that the resulting pricing structure would re-
flect unduly favorable conditions for the foreign purchaser, and ulti-
mately higher prices for American consumers. When these two prohibited
practices occur in concert, the FTC takes the position that the antitrust
provisions are appliable to cases of foreign bribery engaged in for the pur-
pose of obtaining a foreign government contract such that the U.S. com-
petitors are denied their rights of exportation.
45
15 U.S.C. § 46(h) (1976).
,37 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
.38 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
"39 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
140 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1976).
'" 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
141 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).
143 Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 829 (N.D.
Ohio 1964); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc., 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
114 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976).
" REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 26.
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D. The Overseas Private Investment Corporations
The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) insures U.S.
investors against losses due to expropriation, the inconvertibility of local
currency, and war, as well as losses incurred on long term investments to
friendly, less developed countries. 146 A year before the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act was passed, a bill was introduced in Congress requiring that
OPIC insurance be used to protect investors from the consequences of
illegal foreign bribes to government officials.4 7 The Department of State
did not support that bill because officials sensed that a possible misun-
derstanding might ensue.' s If OPIC insurance were cancelled as a re-
sponse to a corporate act of bribery, the Department of State hypothe-
sized that a foreign government might interpret that gesture as an
endorsement of extreme retaliatory action, such as expropriation.4 9 The
Department of State also foresaw that OPIC investigations into bribery
charges might be perceived as an undesirable extraterritorial application
of U.S. law. This intrusion could later seriously impinge on dispute reso-
lution efforts. 50
E. International Organizations
International organizations have assumed a role in formulating mul-
tinational codes of conduct which render bribery illegal. Such codes, how-
ever, have not yet been effective as the direct basis for litigation. The
United Nations (U.N.), the organization with the most expansive influ-
ence based on size of membership and subject matter jurisdiction, has
been actively preparing a code of multinational conduct.' 5' However, its
Working Group'52 has dealt with the issue of corrupt practices in only
very general terms.15 3
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) is an independent organization whose membership is restricted
to those developed Western countries in which most multinationals are
1"s 22 U.S.C. § 2191 et seq. (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
S. 3463, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
Boeker, Developing Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, 77 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 475, 479 (1977).
149 Id.
150 Id.
"' Note, Transnational Corporations- The United Nations Code of Conduct, 5
BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 129, 130 (1979).
Il In 1976, at the second meeting of the United Nations Commission of Transnational
Corporations (which evolved from the Economic and Social Council), the Commission cre-
ated an Intergovernmental Working Group of the Whole (Working Group) to which was
delegated the responsibility of preparing and drafting a multinational code of conduct. Id.
at 131-33, 132 n.22.
153 Id. at 142-43.
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headquartered.5 ' Approximately 80 percent of the total world investment
is generated in those OECD member countries. 5" As compared with ac-
tions taken by other international organizations, the OECD has taken the
most advanced steps to determine guidelines on the issue of improper
payments."' OECD proposals usually attain an ideological consensus be-
cause of the somewhat common heritage of its members. Although more
likely to receive worldwide acclamation than the U.N. proposals, the
OECD guidelines, similar to the plan offered by the U.N., lack the power
of enforcement. The OECD guidelines have no binding effect and func-
tion merely as an advisory opinion.157
Both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)"' and
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) have been considered as
potential arenas for constructing a multinational response to the issue of
questionable foreign payments.1 5' GATT has a large membership, but its
focus is trade, not investments. Although GATT provides a favorable fo-
rum because it has an established dispute resolution procedure,' 60 com-
bining the issues of trade and questionable foreign payments could place
the United States in a precarious bargaining position. 6 ' The ICC also has
an existing procedure for dispute resolution, which is directed towards
corporate commercial activities."' This highly respected group has de-
voted some effort to the issue of questionable foreign payments by form-
ing a Commission of Unethical Practices which was charged with develop-
ing a "code of good business behavior.116 3 The ICC has concluded that
the business sector itself should deal with the problem of foreign bribery
and that self-regulation would be the most effective approach.
1 64
F. An Overview
The Securities and Exchange Commission along with numerous other
federal agencies and international organizations, has been discussed with
the question in mind as to whether it is the appropriate agency to police
multinational bribery activity. By its own admission, the SEC has an ad-
ministrative problem. As it revealed, "Projects for future improvements
154 See REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 39.
'5 Boeker, supra note 112, at 477.
66 REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 39.
157 See REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 40.
18 Opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. (pts. 5, 6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 188.
'59 See REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 41.
160 REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 41.
:6, REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 42.
12 REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 42.
163 REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra nbte 10, at 43.
164 REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE FOREIGN PAYMENTS, supra note 10, at 43.
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in operations depend to a large extent on our ability to cope with our own
paperwork problems."' 165 The initial concern over questionable or illegal
foreign payments has been obfuscated. Originally, legislation in this area
was intended to protect the rights and interests of the public investors.'"
The breadth of corporate activity and the distance created between the
corporation and the public investors has increased significantly. Conse-
quently, it is arguable that most investors do not know or care if the cor-
poration in which they have an interest pays a bribe. The synergistic ef-
fect of repeated bribery disclosures, however, has become significant.
Investors, and the American public as a whole, are concerned with the
appearance of U.S. corporations to the rest of the world.17 If the Ameri-
can public overtly condones or at least implicitly accepts foreign bribery,
the Nation risks being perceived as unethical or immoral. Therefore, the
collective American self-respect demands public outrage at the thought of
bribery.
The issue of questionable foreign payments has received attention on
two levels, the domestic and the international. Domestically, in a sincere
attempt to address this problem, several federal agencies have been
granted authority to take action. The SEC has been working with the
Justice Department to ensure that public investors have a complete
awareness as to a registered corporation's operations and manner of
achieving its business purpose. The FTC has sought to promote fair
methods of business competition which are necessary for maintaining a
free market economy. The IRS has focused its attention on the accurate
reporting and tax assessment of corporate income, once again, to stimu-
late foreign investments and protect the interest of U.S. investors in ex-
traordinary circumstances. Unfortunately, the result of this division of
domestic authority has been piecemeal legislation which deals separately
with tax evasion, the formation of monopolies, or nondisclosure. Each
agency seems to be wearing blinders to the other important issues in
which the agency does not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Internationally, the efforts are just beginning. Several groups have
addressed the problem of questionable foreign payments, including: the
U.N., the OECD, GATT and the ICC. Two major problems confront
these groups. First, not all countries which act in a home or host capacity
are members of any of these organizations. Second, once a code of con-
duct is developed, it functions merely as a set of voluntary guidelines; no
country is bound to follow its mandate. The issue is beginning to receive
more attention internationally, but any attempts to eradicate the incon-
sistent approaches or to standardize legislative efforts are still in the ges-
" [1976] SEC ANN. REP. 167.
'" See notes 57 & 78:79B supra and accompanying text.
Me' See How Clean Is Business?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 50.
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tation period, lacking any unanimity of action or policy.
V. A NEW APPROACH
At this point, when the primary issue seems to have shifted from
concern for the individual investor to a justification of each agency's own
existence, the fundamental problem must be approached anew. The prob-
lem of illegal foreign payments has become such a pervasive practice that
a fragmented, albeit sincere, effort will no longer suffice.
International commissions or guidelines are helpful in representing a
valuable multinational effort to reach a point of increased understanding
and communication on a common problem. It is imperative, however, that
the initial effort be directed toward arriving at a unified national
approach.
Attention should be focused on the creation of a new commission, of
limited duration, which would address the problem and its impact from a
fresh perspective. In order to preclude the possibility of narrow-minded-
ness, the temporary commission might be composed of representatives
from the SEC, FTC, Justice Department, and the IRS, along with corpo-
rate representatives from both the United States and a number of host
countries.
Once there is a consensus amongst the commission members that for-
eign bribery should remain illegal, based on ethical, economic, and foreign
policy justifications, along with other frames of reference, a specialized
multidisciplinary division of an existing department should be estab-
lished. This body would provide and promote a cohesive application of
those U.S. laws which impact on the extraterritorial operations of the
U.S. multinational public corporation. Initially, it is expected that certain
definitional boundaries will be unclear. However, this department,
charged with a singular responsibility, will facilitate the creation of an
easily adaptable working standard. Absent such a single function institu-
tion, virtually any one agency faces the same plight of too many duties
and too few resources. After such a unified approach has been under-
taken, probably the most effective policy would be a strategy to en-
courage support and disseminate information throughout the internal
corporate ranks to ensure the understanding and the ordering of priori-
ties. Perhaps a more positive result could be obtained if corporate codes
of conduct were standardized throughout the country. The most impor-
tant feature of any corporate code of conduct is that all of the employees
understand it and integrate it into their professional behavior.
Concurrent with this program should be a demand for greater indi-
vidual accountability. A system of exorbitant financial penalties should be
imposed with the burden of payment to be borne exclusively by those
employees who directly handle questionable foreign payments. Subse-
539'
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quent to an initial grace period, the penalties for infractions should be
stiffened.
By implementing such a plan, the corporate veil is removed as a
shield for employee misfeasance. Any offense that occurs will be that
much more serious because the provisions will have been so clearly delin-
eated within the corporate sector. Hopefully, the employee will then be-
come more discriminating in selecting the activities in which to partici-
pate and endorse. Only through this pragmatic approach, recognizing the
frailities of human nature, will other options for generating multinational
business and for streamlining its subsequent regulation be thoughtfully
developed.
